

## **A Theoretical Approach to Political Regionalism**

**Simon Schwartzman**

Paper presented to the International Seminar on Social Indicators of National Development in Latin America, organized by the International Social Science Council and the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio De Janeiro (Conjunto Universitário Cândido Mendes) Rio de Janeiro, May, 1972. Published as "Um Enfoque Teórico do Regionalismo Político," in Jorge Balán (ed.), *Centro e Periferia no Desenvolvimento Brasileiro*, São Paulo, Difel, 1974.

It should be evident by now that the analysis of the Brazilian political system cannot preclude regional cleavages and differentiations from systematic consideration<sup>1</sup>. The relevance of the analysis of regional politics is, in a way, a matter of course: if one wants to go deeper into the study of a given political system, one should move from the analysis of the overall structure into the study of regional differentiations and subsystems; the larger the population and the geographical area covered by the system, the more important this is. The idea here, however, goes further: the proposition is not only that the analysis of regional subsystems provides a better understanding of the national system, but that the national system cannot be properly understood without its regional components.

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper is part of a broader study of the Brazilian political system in historical perspective. Earlier published papers include "Representação e Cooptação Política no Brasil" (*Dados* 7, 1971, *Desarrollo Economico*, 141, 1971), "Veinte años de Democracia Representativa en Brasil" (*Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política*, 1971), and "Desenvolvimento e Abertura Política" (*Dados* 6, 1970). The emphasis has been always on the theoretical perspective, rather than on factual data. Excellent studies have recently come out on Brazilian regional history, and they provide the indispensable empirical reference for my interpretations. I am grateful to Antonio Octávio Cintra, Gláucio A. D. Soares, Gustavo Bayer and Peter McDonough for suggestions, comments and criticism, with the usual no blame" clause.

I have made this point before in discussing the role of the state of São Paulo regarding the Brazilian national system<sup>2</sup>. I have stressed the fact that it is impossible to consider São Paulo either as a deviant case in the national picture, or as representative of a "more advanced" stage of development in the country. Two facts are enough to make this point again here. One is the weakness of the national political parties in the state of São Paulo during the 1945-1964 period, which reflected a relative marginality of the economic center of the country regarding the national party system; the other is the relative equilibrium between the processes of urbanization and industrialization which the state underwent during this century.

This differs markedly from the processes of urbanization without industrialization in other metropolitan areas of the country. To consider São Paulo as a deviant case would mean to explain away the historical role of the most important area of the country, in terms of its economy and population, which is obviously not admissible. And there are no reasons to imagine that the present metropolitan areas of the country, such as Rio, Belo Horizonte, Recife and others, will eventually replicate the Paulista pattern of intensive industrialization leading a process of urban concentration.

Nor is São Paulo the only "different" case. The state of Rio Grande do Sul, bordering Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, has played historically a political role in the national system which has been quite out of proportion to its size and economic weight<sup>3</sup>. Rio Grande do Sul is not a region of traditional politics based on local bonds and loyalties in a stagnant economy, which are held by many as the core of traditional Brazilian politics. It has never been a dominant economic pole and was never at the administrative center of the country. On the contrary, it is a frontier state, thousands of miles away from the

---

<sup>2</sup> For the role of São Paulo in the Brazilian political and economic systems, especially before 19145, see Warren Dean, *The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880-19145* (Austin: the University of Texas Press, 1969), and my discussion in "Representação e Cooptação", above.

<sup>3</sup> For the role of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazilian regional politics, see Joseph L. Love, *Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971). For a scholarly account of the social and political fabric of Rio Grande do Sul in the XIX Century, see F. H. Cardoso, *Capitalismo e Escravidão no Brasil Meridional*, (São Paulo, Difusão Europeia do Livro, 1962).

country's capital, but this geographical marginality seemed to have placed the state in the very center of national politics from the beginning of the twentieth century on. The special role of Rio de Janeiro, as the locus of the national government, it probably easier to understand, and the same applies to the state of Minas Gerais, which is closer to what "traditional" politics is supposed to be, in historical terms.

We have, in short, at least four main regional actors in the political system, which behave in quite different ways, having important but sometimes unexpected impact on the national system: the economic center (São Paulo), the urban and administrative center (Rio de Janeiro), the traditional countryside (Minas Gerais) and the frontier state (Rio Grande do Sul). To spell out the theoretical framework of their interplay is the objectives of this paper<sup>4</sup>.

## **1. State and Society**

Stein Rokkan has presented us with a highly sophisticated and complex framework for the study of nation building and the development of political and party cleavages in Western Europe<sup>5</sup>. It would probably be unwise to try to apply directly his whole analytical framework to the study of the Brazilian political system; but it will be essential to bear it in mind as we try to unfold the variables which characterize the process of regional differentiation and national integration of Brazil in a more inductive and, as it were, "natural" way.

---

<sup>4</sup> It is important to notice that I am leaving out from the picture Bahia and Pernambuco, states which have been national political and economic centers in the colonial period, and which have suffered a marked process of political "atimie". I am assuming that they fall in the traditional pattern typified by Minas Gerais, but this is certainly a simplification that should be taken with care.

<sup>5</sup> Stein Rokkan, *Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building, A Possible Paradigm* (1971, mimeographed); and 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: an Introduction' (with S. M. Lipset) in S. Rokkan and S.M. Lipset, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967). Charles Tilly has suggested an extremely interesting framework for the analysis of Western European nation building that is within the same perspective. Unfortunately, I have only come across the preliminary draft of his paper (*Notes on West European state making Since 1500*, Michigan, 1970, mimeographed).

The point of departure is the classic differentiation between state and society. It is well acknowledged today that there are substantial differences between the meaning of the word "state" in the Anglo-Saxon and in other intellectual traditions; these differences have to do with actual historical differences, and led to the relative "statelessness" of Anglo-Saxon political theory. J. P. Nettl has argued for the importance of taking the "variable degree of stateness" as a central variable in cross national studies<sup>6</sup> and Reinhardt Bendix, in an earlier text, made a similar point<sup>7</sup>.

The essence of the argument has to do with the idea that the state is not only a concept referring to the integration and sovereignty of a given population in a given territory, in which case the notion of different levels, or degrees of stateness would be meaningless, but it refers rather to a specific institution within a country which not only performs the functions of boundary maintenance and sovereignty, but can also be smaller or bigger, stronger or weaker, independent or controlled by other social groups and institutions. It means, in other words, to shift from a functional to a more structural perspective, that is, to study the state as an institution endowed with a changing structure of its own.

Both Bendix and Nettl place the different conceptions of State in historical and theoretical perspectives. Bendix calls attention to the existence of two main approaches in political theory since, at least, Machiavelli. The first and older of these approaches is Machiavelli's own; he thinks of political facts and events as functions of the abilities and virtues of the political leader, the Prince. In a more general form, this tradition leads to the perception of the state as the unit that organizes the wills and aspirations of the

---

<sup>6</sup> "The relative "statelessness" of American social science coincides with the relative statelessness of the United States, with the long period during which the egalitarian and pluralistic society predicted with sensitive fingertips by Tocqueville was becoming institutionalized over a vast continent. One has only to read Lipset or Mitchell to see that an American socio political self-examination simply leaves no room for any valid notion of state". J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable", *World Politics*, XX, 4, 1968, p. 559-592.

<sup>7</sup> Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and the political Community", in R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset (eds), *Class, Status and Power*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Free Press, 1966).

society as a whole, defining and working towards its goals. There is no question of responsiveness from the ruler to the ruled, and it is as if there were no resistance from the social structure to the Prince: the only limitations to his will are his own fancy and wit. This is, of course, an extreme conception which has the absolutist state as its implicit empirical reference.

The other theoretical tradition stems from Rousseau: the state acts by delegation from the population according to an explicit and well-limited social contract. The idea of a social contract had, of course, a meaning which is ideological and normative, since it appeared in a context of struggle against Absolutism: but it also had the sociological value of being an empirical statement on how politics is performed when social groups are strong and the government weak. The contractual notion of state was equivalent to a Copernican revolution in political thought, leading to a shift in perspective which led, quite often, to the very annihilation of the state as an autonomous variable worth the attention of 'the political analyst. In this extreme conception, as a matter of fact, the state is nothing but the locus through which the dominant groups or classes exercise their will, without a political texture of its own.

It is Hegel, as seen through the criticism that Marx addressees to his *Philosophy of Law*<sup>8</sup>, who opens the way for the analysis of the relationships between State and civil society as separate and often contradictory structures. Hegel distinguishes between civil society, which is the state of necessity, and the State, which represents the general will, the unity of political life. More specifically, for Hegel the civil society is the *phenomenon* of the State, while the State is the *idea* of society. The idea presents itself as the Sovereign and the Constitution, and the mediation between the Idea and society is performed by several intervening institutions, such as public opinion, the representation of civilian groups in the state, the bureaucracy, and so on<sup>9</sup>.

---

<sup>8</sup> G. W. Hegel, *Principes de la Philosophie du Droit* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940), translated by André Kaán, specially after page 255.

<sup>9</sup> I am following here the discussion of Jean Hippolite, *Études sur Marx et Hegel* (Paris: Marcel Riviere. 1965), which refers to the classic work of G. Luckacz on the young Hegel.

One of the main points of the criticism is the stress that Marx puts in the private character of the bureaucracy. For Hegel, bureaucracy is the soul of the State, and the private activities of the civil servants perform a universal function. For Marx, however, the bureaucrat ends up making of this universal function his private business. For Hegel, bureaucracy has as its first assumption the autonomy and organization of the civil society in private corporations. The choice of civil servants and public authorities is conceived as a mixed choice, initiated in the private sector and approved by the Sovereign. The fact is, says Marx, that this kind of penetration of the civil society into the State leads to nothing but the creation of another kind of private corporation, the bureaucracy. "The corporations are the materialism of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy is the spiritualism of the corporations; but the corporation is the bureaucracy of the civil society, and the bureaucracy is the corporation of the State. And, later on:

"The bureaucracy has in its power the being of the State, the spiritual being of society, it is its *private property*. The general spirit of the bureaucracy is its *mystery*, kept inside it by the hierarchy, and kept from outside by its characteristics of private corporation. The spirit of the State, when it is known by everybody, is thus perceived by the bureaucracy as a treason of its mystery. *Authority* is then the principle of its science, and the *idolatry* of authority its sentiment. But, inside the bureaucracy itself, *spiritualism* becomes a *sordid materialism*, the materialism of passive obeisance, of faith in the authority, of the *mechanicism* of fixed formal activities, of fixed principles, ideas and traditions. For the bureaucrat taken as an individual, the goals of the State are his private goal: the hunting for higher positions, the push in his way up"<sup>10</sup>.

This notion of a bureaucracy with private interests includes, of course, the conception of the state as the political arm of a given social class, but is more general than that. Nettl discusses this in some length, and shows how Marx partially lost interest in the problem of the state when he moved intellectually as well as physically from Europe to England

---

<sup>10</sup> This is a free translation of the French version of the "Critique de la Philosophie d'État de Hegel", K. Marx, *Oeuvres Philosophiques* (Paris, Molitor, vol.14, p.103). Stresses in the original.

and when, in writing *Das Kapital*, he concentrated on the much more "English" analysis of economic forces and consequent class relations rather than on the problems of ideological consciousness and revolution in a state-dominated Europe<sup>11</sup>.

Bendix shows how Machiavelli himself recognized the existence of two types of government, on the one by "the Prince and his servants" and the other by the Prince and by Barons<sup>12</sup>. While in the first type the Prince is the only source of power, in the latter there are rights of political influence which are obtained through heritage and do not depend on the Prince's favor. This second type of political power characterizes a state of balance between the central power and what would latter be called the "civil society", each with some autonomy of decisions and initiative. and each trying to limit and direct the behavior of the other. The fact that the "Barons" are just a tiny group of aristocrats is less important, theoretically, than the notion that their sources of power do not come from the Prince.

Once this duality of power sources is established, it will expand and differentiate in several directions. What is important here is the idea that this is not a simple matter of functional differentiation, in which the State performs the political functions of vertical authority and domination, while 'the Barons' retain the horizontal functions of solidarity and interest aggregation and articulation. What happens, in fact, is that aggregation and articulation of private interests are carried on within the structures of authority, while systems of authority are developed in the "private" sector of society and reach towards the control of the state. The actual balance between these two tendencies varies, and has to be determined empirically. The more significant theoretical point, here, is the notion that the characteristics of a given state structure cannot be fully deduced from the characteristics of its "civil society" (or, in contemporary terms; its class structure), just as this society cannot be fully understood from the formal characteristics of its governmental organization.

---

<sup>11</sup> "State as a conceptual Variable", p.572. The main reference here is Eugene Kamenka, *The Ethical Foundation of Marxism* (New York, 1962).

<sup>12</sup> N. Machiavelli, *The Prince* (New York: The Modern Library, 19140), p. 15, quoted by R. Bendix, *Max Weber - An Intellectual Portrait* (New York. Doubleday, 1960), p 360.

## 2. Patrimonialism and the Growth of the State

In the contractual model, the government does not have power of its own, in acts by delegation and with resources provided by the civil society. In fact, as demonstrated in Marx's criticism of *Theory of Law*, the organization which performs this delegation develops private resources and private interests. This occurs when the state acts by delegation of the "whole society" as well as when it behaves more or less clearly as "the instrument" of a given class. One of the reasons for that is, of course, the simple growth and differentiation of government. From the theoretical role of a simple *gendarme* and mediator; the "stateless" state of the 19th Century referred to by Nettl develops into a giant which makes the simple interest group approach to political analysis little more than a historical relic. E. E Schattschneider stressed this point very strongly:

"While we were looking to the other way, the government of the United States became a global operation a decade or two ago. The budget is about two hundred fifty times as large as it was seventy years ago". In a purely formal sense we can say that the government of the United States is the same one that was established in 1789 - in about the same way in which Henry Ford's bicycle repair shop is the same as the Ford Motor Company today"<sup>13</sup>.

What is more remarkable about the American system is not as much this development in itself, as the fact that it did not lead to a more thorough annihilation of independent power sources. American liberalism, according to one of its best critics, Theodore J. Lowi, guarantees the privatization of the public sector. Referring to the agricultural sector, for instance, he sees it as an extreme case of "private expropriation of the public authority". "This is the feudal pattern", he continues; "fusion of all statuses and functions and governing through rigid but personalized fealties. In modern dress, that was the corporatist way"<sup>14</sup>. The difference between this neo-corporatism of the Liberal State and the Corporative State as such is that, in the latter, the State behaves explicitly and

---

<sup>13</sup> E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, 1966), p. 116-117.

<sup>14</sup> Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 102.



legitimately on behalf of a group which have control of the state apparatus as the basis, rather than as an instrument of its social, economic and political power.

The idea of economic power based on the State, and not the opposite (that is, political power based on economic resources) is difficult to accept in 'stateless' political theories, and this helps to explain the odyssey of the "Asian mode of production" in the Marxian literature<sup>15</sup>. As it appears in the recently rediscovered *Grundrisse*<sup>16</sup>, this concept applies to some pre-capitalist forms of economic organization, which are characterized by the partial or total non existence of private property, or at least by the existence of a predominant public sector in the economy:

"Étant le véritable propriétaire et la véritable condition de la propriété collective, l'unité peut elle-même sembler distincte et au-dessus de la multitude des communautés particulières: l'individu est alors, en fait, sans propriété »<sup>17</sup>.

Marx distinguishes two subtypes of these pre-capitalist forms, one which is generally based on the large scale organization of rural economies, usually through nationally integrated systems of water irrigation works<sup>18</sup> and other more based on urban centers, where

---

<sup>15</sup> For a lengthy discussion of the concept and its history and fate in the Marxist literature, see Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), chapter 9.

<sup>16</sup> Published in Russia first in 1939. Translated into French by Roger Dangeville, as *Fondements de la critique de l'Économie Politique* (Paris: Anthropos, 1967). The reference is from vol. 1, p. 437.

<sup>17</sup> In this context, the reference to irrigation works seems to be exemplificative; for Wittfogel, however, they are an essential part of what he calls indifferently "hydraulic societies" or "oriental despotisms".

<sup>18</sup> *Fondements*, p. 439.

"La guerre est donc la grand tache collective, le grand travail commun, exigés soit pour s'emparer des conditions maternelle d'existence, soit pour défendre et perpétuer l'occupation"<sup>19</sup>.

There is no need to go here into the expanding debate that still revolves around the concept of "Asiatism". It is enough to keep in mind that this type of economic and political organization does not fit the evolutionary model which goes from slavery to serfdom to wage labor and capitalism, a model in which the interest group politics concept belongs, and which is more or less implicit in the "stateless" theories of social development. It is a fact that the Western states which attained high levels of development during this century have followed more or less that pattern, and there is a high correlation between a decentralized and feudal-like system in the past and high economic development in this century. "Hydraulic societies", bureaucratic and centralized empires of the past were way above medieval Europe according to almost any standards of development, but it was as if they could not adapt themselves to modern industrial society; while countries with a feudal past (the only one in Asia which comes close to it being Japan) were much more able to adopt modern and efficient forms of economic organization. Thus, and contrary to what is sometimes held, feudalism does not seem to have been a factor of underdevelopment, but on the contrary, it was its absence, and the dominance of a bureaucratized and overgrown state, which seemed to have been one of its determinants. Coming late into a world developed through capitalist initiative; these countries have only their own inflated states to bring them to the world of industrial development<sup>20</sup>.

### **3. Cleavages in Patrimonial states**

The concept of "Patrimonialism" acquires its full characterization in Max Weber, as referring to a type of traditional domination where the government "is an extension of the ruler's household". It is essential to recall that this concept is used as an alternative to another major type of traditional domination, feudalism<sup>21</sup>. There are a few characteristics

---

<sup>19</sup> This model is explicit in Engel's *The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State*. See its discussion in K. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, pp. 382 and ff.

of patrimonialism which lead more or less directly to the political cleavages which are bound to appear in states with this type of domination.

First, patrimonial states tend to be urban-based, and to develop urban civilization. These urban centers can be either the capital of an empire, or a city-state with trade and military interests abroad. Characteristically, these centers tend to have a sizable floating population, and an aristocracy that has to be fitted somehow in the governmental bureaucracy. The first political problem of patrimonial states has to do with keeping the urban masses content, and keeping the governmental jobs open to the urban aristocracy.

Second, there is the classic tension between the ruler and its officers: "All patrimonial states of the past have involved a pattern of decentralization that has been determined by the struggle for power between the ruler and his retainers and officers"<sup>22</sup>. As the patrimonial realm grows, so grows the need to delegate power and authority, and at the same time the feasibility of central control is reduced. Moreover, retainers of patrimonial delegation tend to receive their posts as political prebends, and to use them as their private property. When the patrimonial state is based on military conquest and occupation, this pattern leads to the development of private, or praetorian military bodies, which have more loyalty to their own captains than to the ruler. When the patrimonial state is based on region agriculture, regional atomization occurs, with the emergence of semi-autonomous satraps.

The third type involves a pattern of continuous belligerence between the patrimonial state and other states at its borders. It is reasonable to suppose that military occupation and

---

<sup>20</sup> In the background of this thesis is, among other things, the debate created by Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). Previous relevant works which lead to the same notion include Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), and R. Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry*, which deals with the role of the state in the class relations of industrial society (New York: Wiley, 1956). For a broader reference, see Simon Schwartzman, "Desenvolvimento e Abertura Política", *Dados* 6, 1969, p. 36-141.

<sup>21</sup> R. Bendix, *Max Weber - An Intellectual Portrait* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 360.

<sup>22</sup> R. Bendix, *Max Weber*, p. 348

direct exploitation are just extreme cases of patrimonial military expansion. The history of the old empires, including the Roman Empire, shows a clear pattern of expansion which includes, first, military occupation, loot and enslavement of part of the local population, but afterwards the establishment of some kind of federation between conqueror and conquered, very often with the maintenance of the local ruling class in its positions. The rationale for this arrangement is obvious, since the maintenance of the local economic and political structure assures a continuous flow of revenue towards the patrimonial state, through levies and taxes of all kinds, which cannot be kept flowing in predatory conquests. The maintenance of this kind of local autonomy means that some power remains outside the state, and that tensions and conflicts are bound to arise.

A not altogether different situation arises when some forms of autonomous activity emerges within the patrimonial dominion, with or without the ruler 's consent and intention. One pattern here is the emergence of some industry or agriculture for the foreign market, which is heavily taxed by the state. The state stimulates this activity, but at the same time functions as a parasite which limits and eventually kills the autonomous activity. This situation is different from the patrimonial state in the "hydraulic" type of society, where the government plays an active role in the organization and administration of the economy. Here, all the initiative comes from the private sphere, and the role of the state is almost purely fiscal. In absolutist Europe, this process was represented by the emergence of strong trade and industrial centers, which paralleled the progressive decay of feudal power. Eventually, it led to the emergence of bourgeois aspirations and values which brought about the destruction of the patrimonial state. In his analysis of Weber's theories on the emergence of legal rationality, Bendix shows that "in Western Europe patrimonial power eventually promoted the formal rationality of law and administration, and this conflicts with the tendency of patrimonial rulers to promote substantive justice and personal favoritism". This process is explained by Weber, among other things, as a consequence of the need for the central government to "restrain the power pretensions of vassals and office-holders. This was done through the establishment of a "centrally controlled officialdom", and "'in the struggle against the entrenched position of the states,

patrimonial rulers were frequently supported by the rising bourgeoisie”<sup>23</sup>.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that patrimonialism of the western European kind, as it existed in the absolutist regimes, was very different from other versions. The main difference consists in the fact that western European patrimonialism was strengthened together with the emergence of the bourgeoisie at the end of the process the system of legal domination which inherited the absolutist regimes was mostly contractual, and the most suited to modern capitalism. It would certainly be possible to trace the differences between "state" and "stateless" societies, suggested by Nettl, back to the varying balance between bourgeois and the patrimonialistic powers in the struggle against the remains of the feudal, corporatist society. It is remarkable how Weber himself does not seem to have elaborated on the structural differences which could explain the variations in legal rationality and authority between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental European countries. These differences are minimal, nevertheless, when compared with the states which changed from an original patrimonialistic system to a modern centralized state, without the mediation of a "bourgeois" revolution. These states are able to modernize and rationalize its bureaucracy, but their power basis and political systems will necessarily be quite different from the Western democracies. And they make, of course, the bulk of the non-western countries of today.

#### **4. A fourfold regionalization**

The previous discussion gives the theoretical background for the interpretation of the four types of Brazilian regions which are suggested at the beginning. The gap between the theoretical discussion and the Brazilian case can now be covered by showing how Brazilian regions belonged to a more general type, a species which has to do with the historical presence of a patrimonialist state.

---

<sup>23</sup> R. Bendix, *Max Weber*, p. 405-406.

That Portugal did not fit into the classical European type feudal organization is well established among historians:

"A nobreza, a seguirmos Antônio de Souza, nunca chegou a criar raízes no campo, nem teve função civilizadora, função de direção e proteção dos moradores locais; apresentava-se, antes, como parasita da população e do poder central"<sup>24</sup>.

Power was concentrated in the House of Avis, and this helps to explain the remarkable entrepreneurial push which 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century Portugal showed. Coming to Brazil, the centralized, bureaucratic and patrimonialist structure of government was transplanted, first with the establishment of the General Government in 1548, and much later with the migration of the whole Portuguese to Rio in 1808<sup>25</sup>. Made independent in 1822 by a member of the Portuguese Royalty, the line of continuity was never completely broken, and this is important for an understanding of the stability of the Brazilian government during the colonial period and afterwards in the second half of the nineteenth century. Prior to the establishment of the General Government in 1548, a system of feudal-like captaincies was promoted, without success. These captaincies were to be transmitted from father to son, and the Portuguese Crown had to buy one of them back when the General Government was to be created<sup>26</sup>. The system of captaincies did not work out, the historians say, but two of them enjoyed some success. One was Pernambuco, where the sugar culture flourished as the main product of the Colony in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The other was São Vicente, later known as the Province and State of São Paulo.

---

<sup>24</sup> Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (ed), *História Geral da Civilização Brasileira*, tomo I (São Paulo: Difusão Europeia do Livro, 1960), p. 18.

<sup>25</sup> The main source for the analysis of Portuguese patrimonialism in Brazil is Raymundo Faoro, *Os Donos do Poder - Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro* (Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1958). For an overview of Spanish patrimonialism, see Magali Sarfatti, *Spanish Bureaucratic Patrimonialism in America* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1966). See also my discussion of this in 'Representação e Cooptação Política no Brasil', *Dados* 7, p. 17 and ff.

<sup>26</sup> "Those inalienable land grants transmitted by inheritance to the oldest son brought to the New World some of the residues of feudalism long on the wane in the Iberian peninsula". E. Bradford Burns, *A History of Brazil* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 24.

This brief overview sketches three of our main regions-types. One is the governmental capital, first Salvador, afterwards Rio de Janeiro. This is the most modern area in the country, in more direct contact with European life, and where culture and consumption are more conspicuous. This is also an area of marginal population and underemployment. According to the 1890 Census of Rio de Janeiro, for instance, "about fifty per cent of its employees were in "domestic service" or of profession undeclared". Race was obviously related with this, since slavery had been abolished only two years before. But the differences were not that great: seventy six per cent of the negroes and fifty three per cent of the mulattos were in this group, but also forty three per cent of the whites, which represented 62.5 per cent of the whole "employed" population<sup>27</sup>. This mass of marginal population was a nuisance for the elite, which had to reckon with them when they became restless<sup>28</sup>. Usually, however, Rio presented a picture of popular politics and mass participation that had little to do with how things were really decided, and in this sense it did not differ much from other administrative capitals of non-industrial societies. Its economic resources derived from trade and governmental employment, and its political life was characterized by some degree of tension between the urban bureaucrats and tradesmen, on one hand, and a dependent regional gentry on the other, with occasional mobilization of the populace. Elections turnout never went above five percent of the total population before 1930, and this gives the overall pattern of political participation.

---

<sup>27</sup> Data recalculated from Herbert S. Klein, "The Colored Freedmen in Brazilian Society", *Journal of Social History*, vol. 3, n° 1, 1969, p.50. The original source is Diretoria Geral de Estatística, *Recenseamento Geral de 1890*, Distrito Federal (Rio de Janeiro, 1895), p. 416-421.

<sup>28</sup> . Rio has been, traditionally, the place for popular mobilization on political issues. One of the most well-known examples is the abolitionist campaign in the late 19th century. Another was the rebellion of the population of Rio because of the mandatory inoculation against smallpox, in 1904. Edgard Carone quotes an eyewitness of the 1889 coup which established the Republic which is a good example both of public proximity and public impotence in political issues: "Por ora, a cor do Governo é puramente militar e deverá ser assim. O fato foi deles, deles só, porque a colaboração do elemento civil foi quase nula. O povo assistiu àquilo bestializado, atônito, surpreso, sem conhecer o que significava. Muitos acreditavam sinceramente estar vendo uma parada. Era um fenômeno digno de ver-se. O entusiasmo veio depois (...)" (From a letter of Aristides Lobo, a newsman, quoted in Edgard Carone, *A Primeira Republica* (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1969).

Nineteenth and early twentieth century Rio de Janeiro can be broadly described as a "pre-industrial city" This concept was suggested by Gideon Sjoberg to characterize the urban structures which developed, according to him, in feudal societies, where industrial development had not yet begun. In a footnote, Sjoberg tries to reduce the difference between European and non-European pre-industrial towns:

"Henri Pirenne, in *Medieval Cities*, and others have noted that European Cities grew up in opposition to and were separate from the greater society. But this thesis has been overstated for Medieval Europe. Most industrial cities are integral parts of broader social structures"<sup>29</sup>.

The main difficulty with the notion of pre-industrial city is, of course, the theory of uni-linear development which it implies, and which takes the feudal system as the sole predecessor of modern societies. This point is taken in a rebuttal written to Sjoberg's book by Oliver C. Cox<sup>30</sup>, who states that even in medieval, Europe the cities developed outside the feudal structure, and considers that Sjoberg's notion of pre-industrial city is little more than a residual concept.

Cox's criticism is convincing about the weakness of Sjoberg's argument, but has little to offer in return. The best theoretical clue, not surprisingly, is to be found in Max Weber, with his difference between occidental, vs. oriental city<sup>31</sup>: "The residence of the ruler or of any administrative body being the focal point for the whole country or region is the most important feature in the structure and functioning of oriental cities". In contrast, occidental cities are endowed with "corporate autonomy and autocephaly"<sup>32</sup>. The

---

<sup>29</sup> Gideon Sjoberg, *The Preindustrial City* (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

<sup>30</sup> Oliver C. Cox, 'The Preindustrial City 'Reconsidered'', *The Sociological Quarterly*, V.1964, p. 133-144.

<sup>31</sup> Max Weber, *The City* (translated and edited by Don Martindale and G. Neuwith. New York: Free Press, 1958).

<sup>32</sup> Vatro Murvaer, "Some Tentative Modifications of Weber's Typology: Ocidental vs. Oriental City", *Social Forces*, 44 , March, 1966, pp. 381-389.



theoretical consequences of these differences are manifold, and have to do with differences in social stratification, the role of the army, the existence of autonomous economic activities, education, and so on. These differences are not, of course, a matter of geography, but have to do with the differences between the patrimonial and the feudal variants of traditional domination. City politics in Rio de Janeiro was most certainly "local", in the sense that its bearing on national events was minimal; but the same cannot be said of the politics of its elite, which was eminently national.

The second region is the so-called "traditional" reverse of the bureaucratic and urban capital. Brazilian "traditional" regions have little in common with what appears as "traditionalism" in the standard literature on underdevelopment and modernization. This literature usually takes as "traditional" those peasant or otherwise non-industrial societies which suffer the impact of modernization and industrialization<sup>33</sup>. These traditional societies are, supposedly, in a primitive stage of social and economic development, and the corresponding sociological literature deals with the cultural, emotional and social obstacles to modern values, life-styles and patterns of behavior<sup>34</sup>.

In Brazil, as in some other countries, "traditional" areas are not areas which are still not modernized, but, on the contrary, tend to be areas which have had a period of progress in the past, and then suffered a process of economic decay. The old area of sugar culture in

---

<sup>33</sup> The classic references here are E. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958), and Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958). Implicit in Banfield's work is the assumption that, as people get less backward, their frame of reference expand from "amoral-familism" to "public regardiness" (the presence of "public-regardiness" in the North American upper strata was tested, quite unsuccessfully, in J. Q. Wilson and E. C. Banfield, "Public Regardiness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior", *American Political Science Review*, 58, 4, December 1964, p. 876-887). As for Lerner, his relevance for the sociology of development is certainly not to be minimized. According to Bendix, "the great merit of Lerner's study consists in its candid use of Western modernization as a model of global applicability". (R. Bendix, "Tradition and 'Modernity' Reconsidered", in *Embattled Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 250.

<sup>34</sup> For instance Lucien Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

the Northeast and the old mining areas of Minas Gerais are probably the best examples of Brazilian traditionalism, and both have a past of wealth and national, economic preeminence. One of the most obscure, but more interesting questions about Brazilian economic and political history is what happens with these areas when they lose their export capabilities and recede into the shadow of history<sup>35</sup>. In the case of Minas Gerais, the exhaustion of the mining activities by the second half of the eighteenth century left the province with the largest population in the country, mostly centered in urban settlements, and without a major economic activity of high profitability<sup>36</sup>. The other thing that remained was, most probably, the bureaucratic structure of the Portuguese administration, and this was certainly the means through which the political vocation of the Minas Gerais elite was born.

V. O. Key's *Southern Politics* is probably the best description of a political system that survives a process of political decay, after the defeat in the Civil War, (the eleven states studied by Key are also those of the Southern Confederacy)<sup>37</sup>. He shows them as having at least one common trait with the Brazilian states of the Old Republic, namely the one-party system. Key's analysis of the behavior of Southern Senators suggests a very consistent pattern: they unite whenever the state autonomy is at stake, whenever the racial status quo is threatened, and whenever the national Democratic government needs their support. The arrangement is clear: the Southern Democrats support the government in exchange for control of their own states. In spite of these well-defined patterns, Southern politics was usually "issueless", since even the racial question tended not to be raised.

---

<sup>35</sup> This process of economic decay and the mechanisms of adjustment is the subject of Antônio Barros de Castro, "A Herança Regional do Desenvolvimento Brasileiro", *Ensaio sobre a Economia Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, Forense, 1971, vol II). For an analysis of the economic mechanisms behind the growing inequalities between the Northeast and the Southwest of Brazil, see Nathaniel H. Leff, "Desenvolvimento Economico e Desigualdade Regional: Origens do Caso Brasileiro", *Revista Brasileira de Economia* Vol. 26, 1, Jan - Mar 1972.

<sup>36</sup> In the 1872 Census Minas Gerais concentrated 20.54% of the Brazilian population, as against 13.89% in Bahia and 8.43% in São Paulo. São Paulo takes the lead only in the 1940 Census, with 17.4% of the total population as against 16.4% in Minas.

<sup>37</sup> V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York; A. Knopf, 1949), specially chapter 16, "Solidarity in the Senate".

One-party systems, oligarchic control of the state political machinery, little popular participation, large rural properties in a decaying economy, all these similarities with traditional Minas Gerais are not purely coincidental. The main difference, of course, was that while the Confederate states had been defeated by the industrialized North, in Brazil the political hegemony of the industrial center was never the case<sup>38</sup>.

The smallest unit of traditional politics of this kind is the local community in the countryside, where the local chieftain (in Brazil, the "coronel") exerts its power. A sizable portion of the Brazilian political literature has been devoted to examining the patterns of political traditionalism at the grassroots. The theoretically most successful attempts are those that interpret local and regional political preeminence as a function of the brokerage roles played by the political leaders between local and state and national governments<sup>39</sup>. It is important to note that this interpretation does not imply that the control of the land, family ties and loyalties and personal allegiances did not have a role to play. All these "traditional" elements were certainly present in different degrees, but they worked in a context of economic decay and preeminence of the bureaucratic government at the state and national level.

The third region, represented by São Paulo, is the most important differentiation. Since the very beginning of country's history, the former Captaincy of São Vicente developed independently from the central administration. São Vicente was the first settlement that moved from the coast to the hinterland, in open contradiction with the general policy of settlements of the Portuguese Crown<sup>40</sup>. The history of the expansion of São Vicente

---

<sup>38</sup> In the 1872 Census Minas Gerais concentrated 20.54% of the Brazilian population, as against 13.89% in Bahia and 8.43% in São Paulo. São Paulo takes the lead only in the 1940 Census, with 17.4% of the total population as against 16.4% in Minas.

<sup>39</sup> The best theoretical interpretation of local politics in "traditional" Brazil is certainly Antônio Octávio Cintra, "A Integração do Processo Político no Brasil: algumas hipóteses inspiradas na literatura", *Revista de Administração Pública* (Rio de Janeiro, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, vol.5, n. 2, 1971).

<sup>40</sup> "Mas o caso de São Paulo, onde os colonos e seus descendentes, brancos ou mestiços, se voltarão antes para o interior do que para a marinha é de qualquer forma, uma exceção. Em todo o restante do Brasil a regra, por muito tempo ainda, é Seguir o povoamento aqueles clássicos padrões da atividade colonizadora dos portugueses, regida pela conveniência mercantil e pela sua

includes the hunting expeditions for Indians further and further South, until the military clash with the Spanish Jesuit Missions; expeditions in search of gold and gems, until the clash with other immigrants from Rio and North into the mining areas, during the Emboabas war<sup>41</sup>, and a conspicuous absence of the Province of São Paulo from the first front of national events until the explosion of the coffee plantation in the nineteenth century.

This is not the place for a history of the spectacular development of São Paulo from late nineteenth Century onwards, nor of its political role in the national picture. It is enough to recall that, after the 1940 census, it was the largest Brazilian state in population, and had been for a long time the main source of taxes for the central government, and the focus of the country's industrialization. Politically, São Paulo had played a role that was much less important than its relative size and economic weight<sup>42</sup> and, in 1932, was the last Brazilian state to rise with arms in hand against the central government<sup>43</sup>.

This pattern of relationships between administrative and economic centers is not a peculiarity of Brazil, but is more general, and shared with countries which experienced some industrial development in a context of a strong patrimonial-like state.

Juan Linz finds in Spain the some "paradox" that we find in Brazil:

---

experiência africana e asiática." Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *História Geral da Civilização Brasileira*, vol.1 , p. 129-130.

<sup>41</sup> For a description of the "Emboabas War" which occurred in Minas Gerais around 1700 against the Paulista explorers, see Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *op cit.* , p. 297-369.

<sup>42</sup> See the introduction above, and the development of this point in "Cooptação e Representação Política no Brasil", *Dados* 7, 1970.

<sup>43</sup> Actually, after 1932, Minas Gerais rebelled twice against the Central government: once with the "Manifesto dos Mineiros", against the Vargas dictatorship, and afterwards with the government of Magalhães Pinto against João Goulart, in 1964. In both cases, the central government was soon to be overthrown by the army. São Paulo's Governor Adhemar de Barros also threatened to raise his state against Goulart in 1964; but this attempt was in less consonance with the national civil-military movement and his own political survival was not to be maintained. The differences in pattern are significant.

"Paradoxically, in the recent history of Spain, the most developed regions have felt alienated from the nation state. Having 'economic power' and well being they felt, rightly or wrongly, deprived of 'political power'"<sup>44</sup>.

The differences between Madrid and Barcelona, as expressed in the table below, are strikingly similar to those we could find between Rio and São Paulo:

<b>Spain: Barcelona and Madrid</b>		
	<b>"Bourgeois" Spain (Barcelona)</b>	<b>Madrid</b>
Population 1960	24.20%	7.67%
Per capita income (national average =100)	164	131
Recruitment of Cabinet Members of Franco regime	0.85	6.25
Judges (1958) (+)	0.58	3.24
University Professors (+)	0.95	2.87
(+) ratio of the proportion born in each 'Spain' and the proportion of the population living there in 1910 (taken as a date close to the birth year of the elites) Source: Juan Linz, "The Eight Spains", in Rokkan and Merrit, <i>Comparing Nation</i> (Yale; 1966)		

---

<sup>44</sup> Juan Linz, "The Eight Spains", in L. Merrit and S. Rokkan, *Comparing Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 278 and ff. See the tables comparing Brazil and Spain, below. Juan Linz gives some "soft" data which cannot be easily reproduced for Brazil.. Alfred Stepan, nevertheless, makes an explicit parallel between Madrid - Barcelona and Rio - São Paulo in relation to the recruitment of cadets for the Brazilian Military School. He shows that, in the 1964-66 period, São Paulo concentrated 18.3 per cent of the Brazilian population, but only 8.26 per cent of the Army cadets, giving a ratio of about 5/10. The same ratio for Rio de Janeiro was 90/10, and, for Rio Grande do Sul, 19/10. The ratio for Rio Grande in an earlier period is much higher. Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p.38.

<b>Brazil: Regional inequalities in four States (compared with Brazil as 100)</b>					
	<b>population (1970)</b>	<b>income</b>			
	Urban	from industry	from agriculture	from public sector	total
São Paulo	273	568	195	235	353
Minas Gerais	117	75	122	83	100
Rio de Janeiro (Guanabara)	82	97	6	252	114
Rio Grande do Sul	68	59	126	89	85
Sum of four States	540	799	449	659	652
Brazil	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Source: Fundação IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Estatística, <i>Anuário Estatístico do Brasil</i> , 1971					

Italy seems to be another case in point, with the differentiation among the industrial Northern area, the urban and administrative Center and the rural South, as can be seen in the table below:

<b>Italy: Resident families by branch of economic activity of the head of the family and regions (%)</b>				
	<b>population</b>	<b>number of families with head of family working in:</b>		
Regions:		industry	agriculture	other activities
Settentrionale	448	565	355	471
Centrale	185	175	160	224
Meridionale	245	180	318	202
Insulare	122	80	167	103
Source: Calculated from Instituto Centrale de Statistica, <i>Compendio Statistico Italiano</i> (Roma, 1971), p.21 and 28-9.				

A.F. Organski is aware of the regional discontinuities in Italy, and links the emergence of Fascism with them:

"Some regions modernize faster and further than others because of advantages in resources, available skills, communications with the outside world, or other reasons. Some nations modernize politically and remain backward economically. Other nations are highly urban before they are economically developed or politically modern ( . ..). In the degree of symmetry and the degree of continuity in the changes

of these three sets of variables (social, economic and political modernization) lies a very large portion - certainly a major portion - of the explanation for the appearance of fascist systems, the duration of their tenure, the variation in fascist political attitudes and behavior, and the manner and timing of the termination of the system<sup>45</sup>.

The assumption of unequal, but nevertheless unilinear development is probably the main weakness of this notion. Indeed, if "no nation develops in such a fashion that all regions and all aspects of national life keep in step with all the rest", it remains to be explained why only a few of these nations fall in the fascist pattern of political organization. The fact is that the differences are not just a matter of varying regional and functional rates of growth, but mostly a question of regional structural differentiation, which the imbalances of development reflect.

The fourth region is Rio Grande do Sul, the southernmost state in the country. Its history starts with the establishment of the Portuguese Colony of Sacramento at the Rio de la Plata borders, which was followed almost immediately by an attack from the Spanish governor of Buenos Aires. During most of the eighteenth century the region is the main point of friction between the Portuguese and the Spanish empires in America. After Independence, the military nature of the province remains in terms of the conflicts between Brazil and Argentina about the control of what is today Uruguay, as well as in terms of the separatist revolutionary movement in Rio Grande, which always involved dealings with Argentine and Uruguayan rulers and *caudillos*<sup>46</sup>.

Stein Rokkan has captured an important aspect of European nation building which to some extent parallels the process which Rio Grande underwent. He shows essentially two

---

<sup>45</sup> A. F. Organski, "Fascism and Modernization", in S.D. Wolf (ed.), *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 19-41.

<sup>46</sup> The best study on Rio Grande do Sul political history in the XX Century is certainly Joseph L. Love, *Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971). The Brazilian bibliography about the early period is quite extensive. For a detailed account of the conflicts with the Spanish colonies and afterward, since the establishment of the Colonia de Sacramento, see Alcides Lima, *História Popular do Rio Grande do Sul* (Porto Alegre: O Globo, 1935).

types of city-states developing in Europe: "The Swiss and Dutch confederations were essentially defensive in character: there was no strong conquest centre (...), but a network of strategically placed cities willing to pool their resources in defense of their trading privileges"<sup>47</sup>. To these typical "occidental" cities he opposes another type, developed "at the edges" of the Old Roman Empire. "Paradoxically," he says, "the history of Europe is one of centre formation at the periphery". And, more specifically:

"These power centers at the southeastern and north-eastern corners of the territories of the Roman Church built up crusading frontier empires against the rival world region of the South. This helps to explain the very close symbiosis of Church and State in these e empires: the military might of the State was a decisive instrument in the struggle for the expansion of Western Christendom (...). The Iberian empires brought the same fervor of orthodoxy across-the ocean to the New World: the conquest of Latin America produced an even stronger fusion of religious, political and economic institutions"<sup>48</sup>.

As in a system of Chinese boxes, Rio Grande seemed to have played in Brazil the same role that Portugal and Spain did in Christian Europe: as a frontier military outpost, it developed its own orthodoxy, - Positivism - its peculiar combination of military tradition and cattle-rising culture, and a strong state oligarchy which gathered strength both for the fight against the Spanish and "Porteño" enemy and for the fight for autonomy regarding the Brazilian Empire. The region was (and still is) the basis for the more important wing of the Brazilian army, and furnished a sizable part of its cadres. It played a very active role in national politics since the creation of the "Partido Republicano Riograndense" in 1882, during the military overthrow of the Empire in 1889, and thereafter. It came to national power with Vargas in 1930, who had been formerly Governor of Rio Grande in behalf of the state boss Borges de Medeiros, and with him the "gauchos" literally hitched

---

<sup>47</sup> "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building" (mimeographed draft, 1971), p.21.

<sup>48</sup> p. 23-4.



their horses in the national capital<sup>49</sup>. With Vargas again in 1950, Goulart in 1961, Costa e Silva and Médici after 1964, all these *Gaúcho* presidents testify to the remarkable vocation of Rio Grande to national power, whether through its civilian or military sons.

This brief outline is too short to account for other important aspects of the role of Rio Grande in Brazilian history. It would be important to take into account the internal cleavages in the state, and its special economic role as a supplier of goods to the national market, as well as the importance of early European migration in the state for the development of a high productivity agricultural system<sup>50</sup>. But the fact remains that the political role of Rio Grande at the national level had much more to do with its military, caudillistic, revolutionary and oligarchic tradition than to the modern and Europe-influenced aspects of its economy and society.

## 5. Conclusion

Granting that the fourfold regionalization suggested here is relevant to the study of Brazilian political history, one might still wonder about its usefulness for the analysis of future outcomes in Brazilian politics.

The Brazilian political picture suffered a drastic change after 1945, with the generalization of political suffrage to all adult literate population. The system of mass politics which emerged after 1945 was superimposed upon the regional cleavages, creating a rather complex pattern which I have analyzed elsewhere<sup>51</sup>. To the cleavage between patrimonialistic and the more capitalist areas of national politics, and between

---

<sup>49</sup> For the relationships between Rio Grande "caudillos" and the army, see Sylvio Romero, *O Castilismo no Rio Grande do Sul* (Porto, 1912). J. Love gives a detailed account of the role of Rio Grande in the "military question" which eventually led to the fall of the Empire. He also reproduces a photo of the Gaúchos hitching their horses to the obelisk on Rio's Avenida Rio Branco on November 1, 1930.

<sup>50</sup> For the economic role of Rio Grande as a supplier to the internal market, see the chapter on "Extremo Sul - O precoce desenvolvimento voltado para dentro", of "A Herança Regional do Desenvolvimento Brasileiro", in Antônio Barros de Castro, *Ensaio sobre a Economia Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1971).

<sup>51</sup> S. Schwartzman, "Veinte años de Democracia Representativa en Brasil 1945 - 1962", *Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política*, 2, 1, 1971, pp. 3-25

center, periphery and frontier of the patrimonial state, another cleavage evolving issues of popular participation was added. Basically, two dominant types of political participation emerged, one along the Minas-Rio axis, other more related to the industrial areas of the country. The first was what can be called a "co-optation system", which was defined as a system of political participation in which governmental positions are sought for not as much as resources for implementing sectoral interests, but rather as means of social mobility in themselves. The second, on the contrary, was closer to the classic concept of interest group politics. There are rural and urban as well as capitalist and working-class cleavages in each of these systems, making the simple number of possible combinations quite high. I believe that the regional context for the emergence of mass politics in Brazil is an essential clue for the understanding of this experience of representative democracy, if one intends to go deeper than what the simple concepts of modernization, mobilization, massification or radicalization would allow.

Furthermore, the correct understanding of the 1945-64 system is indispensable if prospects about the political future of the country are to be made. It is clear, for instance, that this discussion shows the naiveté of expecting a new party system to emerge in Brazil in terms of interest group representation. The present restrictions on political activity in the country cannot be taken as a simple consequence of ideological preferences of the government, but must be seen as a development of a historical tradition of governmental centralization and weak autonomous organizations. This means that, if the restrictions on political participation and mobilization were to be lifted, any workable political arrangement should be based in newly created forms of political organization, more in line with the realities of the country and less as a function of the old-fashioned interest group imagery. Once the search for these new forms begins, a correct view of the history of political cleavages in the country will be indispensable.